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1.  Introduction 
 
Over the past decade coastal and marine natural disasters have led to substantial social and economic 
damages around the world, as exemplified by the impacts of hurricanes Katrina (in 2005) and Sandy 
(in 2012) to the North American coastline, the humanitarian disasters caused by tsunamis in the 
Indian Ocean countries (in 2004) and Japan (in 2011), and the devastating damages caused by 
typhoon Haiyan (in 2013) to the Philippines. Scientific studies suggest that climate change might lead 
to an increase in the occurrence or the strength of weather-related natural disasters in the near future 
(e.g., Keohane and Victor, 2010; Min et al., 2011; Pall et al., 2011; Schaeffer et al., 2012). For 
instance, Schaeffer et al. (2012) warn that by 2100, the sea level may be 75-80 cm higher than today’s 
level. The increasing risk of natural disasters may trigger substantial social, economic and political 
instability as well as damages to transport infrastructures (Zhang et al., 2007; Natural Hazards, 2014). 
Located along shorelines, seaports (hereinafter called ‘ports’) are highly vulnerable to coastal and 
marine natural disasters. With more than 80% of globally traded goods being carried by maritime 
transportation (Ng and Liu, 2014), natural disasters may impose severe damages to the global 
economy, as well as unprepared ports. 
Nowadays, the development of effective measures in preventing or alleviating such risks is not a 
choice but a necessity. There is certainly no shortage of research investigating this topic, but the 
research is often dominated by either greenhouse gas (GHG) emission measurement/control due to 
ship and port operations (e.g., Eide et al., 2011; Berechman and Tseng, 2012), or the impacts and 
consequences if such disasters are going to take place, such as the risks posed by climate change (e.g., 
Sanchez-Arcilla et al., 1996; Jevrejeva et al., 2012) and the vulnerability of coastal areas (e.g., El-
Raey, 1997; McGinnis and McGinnis, 2011). Academic work on the measures is relatively rare, 
however. In this case, one should note that damages caused by coastal and marine natural disasters 
can be prevented or alleviated if sufficient investments are made in a timely manner. The investments 
may include: building storm‐surge barriers and promoting beach nourishments, raising the height of 
roads (causeways), improving groins, dykes, levees and seawalls, strengthening a port’s storm water 
system, and improving potable and wastewater emergency response and maintenance for more 
common and more extensive coastal flooding in vulnerable areas.1 These investments are in general 
lumpy and irreversible, and can be quite costly and time-consuming. For example, after the 1953 
North Sea Flood, the Netherlands started the Delta Works to protect a large area of land around the 
Rhine-Meuse-Scheldt delta. The Works were made up of dams, sluices, locks, dykes, levees and 
storm surge barriers. The project was declared finished in 1997. Nevertheless, in 2008 the Delta 
Works Commission made 12 recommendations to the Dutch Cabinet, and called for an additional 
investment of 100 billion Euros over the next 100 years due to increased risks associated with climate 
change and sea level rise. 2  The huge costs and lengthy durations call for careful planning and 
evaluation of these projects, so that investments can be made in a timely and efficient manner.  
 
Despite the wide range of investment options and extensive engineering knowledge, port investments 
on coastal and marine disaster prevention remain a challenging decision that involves great 
complexities. A major challenge is the uncertainty regarding the exact values brought by those 
projects. In most cases, such investments will only render benefits in the case of disasters (while 
providing little value otherwise). Such an uncertainty has led to somewhat arbitrary decisions in 
practice with mixed results. Largely due to the strong will of its mayor Kotaku Wamura, the Japanese 
city of Fudai started building a huge sea wall and floodgates in 1972. The project took 12 years to 
finish and was widely regarded as a waste of £20 million - until it saved more than 3,000 local 
1 The coastal defenses may also be constructed through marine eco-systems (e.g., Tobey et al., 2010). 
2 In 1978 the construction of the Saint Petersburg Flood Prevention Facility Complex was initiated, aiming to 
protect the city from storm surges. This project was completed in 2011, costing US$3.85 billion (“Russia 
completes Soviet-era dam in St Petersburg”, Reuters report, 13 August 2011). 
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residents in the 2011 tsunami.3 In the United States, port facilities at Gulfport, Mississippi, were 
severely damaged by hurricane Katrina in 2005. Soon afterwards, US$570 million from the Federal 
Community Development and Block Grant was allocated to help in Gulfport’s restoration. Somewhat 
ironically, only one day after hurricane Sandy hit New York City, the port announced that it would 
not raise its West Pier by 25 feet as recommended earlier. The stated reason was that building up that 
high would delay the port’s ability to welcome new port tenants – instead, the focus should be shifted 
from disaster recovery to better serving current tenants, attracting new business and creating 
additional jobs.4  
 
Another challenge is related to the allocation of investment responsibilities. Many ports are operated 
under the “landlord port” model, under which a port authority owns basic infrastructure, land and 
access and protection assets and leases them out, mostly on a long-term concession basis, to private 
tenants who are usually expected to finance their own superstructure and heavy equipment (World 
Bank, 2007).5 The responsibilities for investing disaster prevention are usually not clearly (if at all) 
specified in concession agreements, however. The investment responsibilities among port 
stakeholders in paying the (substantial) investment bills are usually not clearly defined, not helped by 
the substantial uncertainties associated with the likelihood and severity of the occurrence of such 
disasters (notably with the impacts of climate change) (Ng et al., 2013). Unsurprisingly, this often 
leads to finger pointing between the port authority and its tenants (e.g., terminal operators, owners of 
other businesses on port land such as warehouse keepers, logistics service providers, owners of 
commercial facilities such as hotels, car parks and shipyards). In many cases, there is also no clear 
government policy guidance on this issue either. As a result, investments are often delayed as each 
side may wish to free-ride the other side’s investment. It should be noted, nevertheless, that delay of 
investments is not necessarily bad per se. It is well known that in the presence of uncertainty, it might 
be better to postpone irreversible investments until more information is available (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994). Thus, there may exist optimal timing for environmental investments and policies (Arrow and 
Fisher, 1974; Henry, 1974).  
 
In short, port investment on coastal and marine disasters prevention is a complex decision, involving 
multiple issues such as the uncertainty of disaster occurrence and hence the value of projects, 
investment responsibility allocation and efforts coordination among stakeholders, and investment 
timing. There has been no clear policy or managerial guidance on such questions as who should pay 
for investments, how much should be invested, and whether government intervention is needed. The 
present paper investigates these questions, focusing on landlord ports.6 We develop an integrated 
3“The Japanese mayor who was laughed at for building a huge sea wall - until his village was left almost 
untouched by tsunami”, MailOnline, 14 May 2011. 
4Information retrieved at http://www.portofthefuture.com/, a website created for distribution of information 
related to the rebuilding efforts by the Mississippi State Port Authority at Gulfport. It appeared that the decision 
of reducing the pier elevation was mostly based on business considerations rather than scientific research. One 
port commissioner stated that “I personally feel that if we get our elevation up to somewhere around 15 feet 
that's going to mean something to somebody that is bringing cargo to our port to be exported. I personally feel 
that if we get it up to 15 feet we’ll be in good shape”; another commissioner was quoted that “That’s based on 
15 being something our contractor told us he could reach in a relative quick period of time. 12 or 14 being what 
some of our tenants said was comfortable for them”. http://www.portofthefuture.com/news-headlines/port-
authority-nixes-25-feet-elevation-for-gulfport/ 
5 Over the last two and half decades, ports around the world have experienced a wave of neoliberal reforms 
towards the landlord model characterized by corporatization and privatization in port planning and management, 
while the public sector maintains in most cases its presence in terms of regulations and the provision of public 
goods. The transformation has made the port community more complex than ever (Martin and Thomas, 2001; 
Xiao et al., 2012). 
6 Despite the attempt by the World Bank in providing an “international” best practice, the concept of a landlord 
port, and the role of the government, has been interpreted differently in different parts of the world, like the 
“Anglo-Saxon,” “Latin” and the “Asian” port doctrines. For further details, see Wang et al. (2004), Lee et al. 
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model that incorporates the uncertainty of disasters and associated value of prevention investments, 
the information accumulation over time and related investment timing, and the investment spillovers 
(externalities) between the port authority and the tenants.  
 
We find that the timing of port investments depends on the probability of disasters. Immediate 
investment is optimal for disasters with a high probability of occurrence, whereas investment should 
be postponed if the probability is very low. The optimal timing for cases of intermediate probability 
cannot be determined as it is influenced by other factors such as discount rate, information 
accumulation and efficiency of investments. Furthermore, the positive spillover between a port and its 
tenants leads to under-investment, which can be corrected with their coordination facilitated by, for 
example, the government (through the port authority). However, since there are also risks of over-
investment due to uncertainty, such government intervention is only optimal when it has a good 
understanding of disaster probability distribution. In particular, unlike in earlier studies where 
coordinated actions lead to a better outcome, coordination in disaster prevention investments between 
a port and its tenants may lead to worse outcomes than would be if they make their decisions 
individually. Our analysis illustrates the importance of scientific research in bringing significant 
economic and strategic values to policy, planning and investment decisions. 
 
The externalities (and hence free-ride) problem has been well recognized in the environment-
protection literature, and the suggested solutions are usually coordinated actions among all parties, 
which may be facilitated by formal agreements, government intervention or market-based 
mechanisms (e.g., Pearce, 1991; Sebenius, 1991; Hoel, 1997; Cooper, 1998; Carraro and Siniscalco, 
1998; Cantore et al., 2009). For the few studies on ports, Homsombat et al. (2013) showed 
analytically that it is important for ports to coordinate their pollution control efforts. More generally, 
Lam et al. (2013) argued that it is important for all stakeholders to be involved in port governance, 
whereas Basso et al. (2014) examined regional coordination in port accessibility investments. At the 
policy level, significant effort has been extended to the international coordination on climate change 
(e.g., the Kyoto Protocol, the negotiation process of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change). Hoel (1990) illustrated, using a non-cooperative game, that if one country reduces 
its emission unilaterally while the policy of other countries is determined solely by their self-interests, 
the outcome of international negotiations may be affected, which could lead to higher total emissions. 
Yuen and Zhang (2012) obtained similar results in the context of airline emissions. Although there are 
studies questioning the feasibility and sustainability of coordination agreements (Carraro and 
Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994) or arguing that the Pareto optimal outcome may be achieved without 
formal coordination under ideal conditions such as competitive markets for labor and products (Hoel, 
1997), no studies have so far dismissed the benefits of coordinated efforts. The intuition is similar to 
the provision of public good in which government intervention is preferred. Finally, few studies have 
investigated the effects of externalities in disaster-prevention investments. Depoorter (2006) argued 
that prevention investments by one government actor confer positive externalities upon other 
government actors by reducing the overall chance of being held responsible. On the other hand, ex 
post disaster relief could involve negative externalities when action by one agency makes other 
agencies look worse. In addition, the results of prevention investments are uncertain and less tangible 
than expenditures in ex post relief. Sending in troops, personnel, and food and medical supplies is 
highly visible and attracts better media coverage as compared to successful disaster prevention efforts. 
As a result, while state and local governments compete with each other in disaster relief efforts, there 
may be under-investment in disaster-prevention investments. Depoorter (2006)’s study is however 
purely descriptive; further, it does not examine investment timing and scale. Therefore, the 
externalities effect needs to be examined, along with uncertainty and optimal timing in an integrated 
model of port disaster prevention investments.  
 
(2008) and Ng and Pallis (2010). In this study, we follow the concept of landlord port as defined by World Bank 
(2007). We believe that landlord ports are the most appropriate choice in examining the issues at hand. 
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There is an extensive literature on environmental policies and investments concerning climate change. 
The Stern Review (Stern, 2007) recognized great uncertainty and called for early actions on CO2 
emission control because “delaying action now means more drastic emissions reductions over the 
coming decades”. On the other hand, Gollier (2006), Nordhaus (2007) and Weitzman (2007), among 
others, criticized the Stern Review for its use of extremely low discount rate, thus that payoffs in the 
distant future have a large present value. Kolstad (1996), Fisher and Narain (2003) and Pindyck 
(2000, 2002) concluded that it is optimal to wait or to reduce the amount of investments in the early 
stage, since GHG build-up is sufficiently slow, and the investment irreversibility effect is much larger 
than the GHG irreversibility effect. In this regard, Pindyck (2007) concluded that the optimal timing is 
model-specific: If catastrophic impacts are not considered, then waiting is a better choice; otherwise, 
early investments may be preferred. Indeed, one main issue affecting the choice of investment timing 
in these investigations is stock externality, as CO2 or other forms of pollution accumulates or decays 
over time. The severity of climate change is determined by the stock of emissions, and thus reduced 
investment today may be compensated by larger investments in the future. Such a feature is clearly 
not present or critical in the analysis of coastal and marine natural disasters. Another major difference 
between the emission/pollution control and disaster prevention lies in the payoff of investments. 
Measures on emission will reduce the stock and thus probability of climate change, whilst the 
investments against disasters offer no benefits if disasters do not occur. Finally, the models on climate 
change usually consider current consumption (or production) and emission simultaneously, since 
more consumption leads to more emission. Such an assumption may not be valid for port disaster 
prevention investments, as a disaster-resilient port does not have to reduce its production or traffic 
volume. Shippers, shipping carriers or freight forwarders may perceive reduced risks of operation 
after the investments, leading to an increase in port traffic (e.g., Hsieh, 2014). We know of no 
published port-investment papers that look at the issues of uncertainty, optimal timing and 
externalities in an integrated model.7 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The model is set up in Section 2. Section 3 examines equilibrium 
outcomes for cases where the stakeholders make individual decisions on disaster prevention 
investments and where the investments are made in period 1 or period 2. The analysis is further 
conducted for cases where the investment decisions are coordinated by government. Section 4 
compares the equilibrium investments and profits various cases, so as to derive managerial and policy 
insights in terms of both investment timing and coordination. Finally, Section 5 contains concluding 
remarks. 
 
 
2.  The Model 
Consider the behavior of a port authority (or a port owner/manager) and a port tenant over two 
periods.8 Both the port authority (hereafter “port”) and the tenant (hereafter “tenant”) receive financial 
returns from the port operations, given by 𝑅𝑝 and 𝑅𝑡 in a period respectively. In each period, there is a 
chance for coastal and marine natural disasters to occur, and the associated probability is presented as 
a random variable x. The occurrence of a disaster will cause a financial damage to both the port and 
tenant. The damage is given by 𝐷𝑥 , where D is a (constant) parameter reflecting the maximum 
possible financial loss. Thus the damage is considered to be proportional to the disaster probability, x. 
 
7 The cases mentioned in the above paragraphs also illustrated a major deficiency in the research so far, namely 
the strong emphasis on the “technical” side of the problem. Indeed, despite repeated calls from scholars and 
practitioners for more research in strategic planning and investment, including defining clear roles and 
responsibilities for both the public and private port stakeholders (National Research Council of the USA, 2010; 
UNCTAD, 2012), this area is still scarcely researched. 
8 As mentioned in the introduction, the tenant may represent such stakeholders as terminal operators, owners of 
other businesses on port land or owners of commercial facilities. 
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The port and the tenant invest 𝐼𝑝 and 𝐼𝑡, respectively, on disaster prevention facilities at the beginning 
of period 1 or period 2, but not both.9 Such investments bring no benefit to them if there is no disaster. 
If there is a disaster however, the investments reduce damages to the port and the tenant by 
  
𝜃𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼𝐼𝑝 and 𝜃𝐼𝑝 + 𝛼𝐼𝑡  
 
respectively, where 𝜃 and 𝛼 are constant parameters satisfying 𝜃 > 𝛼 > 0 and 𝜃 > 1. Positive 𝜃 and 
𝛼 imply that both the port and tenant can benefit, in terms of damage reduction, from not only their 
own investment but also the other side’s investment. Condition 𝜃 > 𝛼 further implies that the benefit 
arising from one’s own investment is greater than that arising from the other side’s investment, 
whereas 𝜃 > 1 implies that the damage reduction is higher from own investment. Therefore, the 
actual damages to the port and the tenant are:  
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥�0,𝐷𝑥 − (𝜃𝐼𝑝 + 𝛼𝐼𝑡)� and 𝑀𝑎𝑥�0,𝐷𝑥 − (𝜃𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼𝐼𝑝)� 
 
respectively. Note that this specification allows for “over-investment” in the sense that when 𝐷𝑥 <
𝜃𝐼𝑝 + 𝛼𝐼𝑡 or 𝐷𝑥 < 𝜃𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼𝐼𝑝, the prevention investments bring no extra benefit other than reducing 
disaster damage to zero.10  
 
The true probability distribution of 𝑥 is represented with a uniform distribution in the range of [𝑥, 𝑥], 
where 0 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑥 ≤ 1. In period 1 however, such information is unknown to the decision makers; as a 
consequence, the perceived distribution is a uniform distribution over the (likely) wider interval of [0, 
1]. In period 2 the true distribution of 𝑥  is known to both the port and tenant owing to a better 
understanding of the coastal and marine natural disasters. Such a specification on information reflects 
the common observation that early estimates of uncertainty associated with environmental issues are 
often based on subjective analysis such as survey and expert opinions (see, for example, estimates of 
the probability and confidence intervals on climate change by Nordhaus 1994 and Roughgarden and 
Schneider 1999), but that the probability can be better estimated with historical data and scientific 
knowledge over time.11 In this model of two periods the time discount factor is denoted as 𝑘 ( 0 <
𝑘 < 1), and the basic structure is depicted in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
9 The assumption that they do not invest in both periods is owing to the general lumpiness and irreversibility of 
such investments as described above. In practice, certain port facilities may be enlarged with additional 
investments and as a consequence, some flexibility is obtained with the arrangements of real options. An 
extended study with such a possibility may shed some new lights on the issue. 
10 Thus, prevention investments would offer no value to both the port and tenant if there were no disasters. In a 
way the specification is similar to insurance, in that insurance is purchased ex ante whereas compensation is 
delivered ex post in the case of a loss. Indeed, studies such as Kuneruther (1996) argued that disaster might be 
mitigated through insurance. However, insurance involves two opposing parties (insurer vs. insured), a scenario 
different from the “horizontal” externality considered in our analysis. In addition, insurance arrangements often 
involve information asymmetry and monitoring efforts for the insured party’s damage prevention efforts. For 
example, Kuneruther (1996) proposed disaster insurance coupled with well-enforced building code (i.e., 
disaster-prevention investment from the insured). This would be a very different setting compared to our model. 
11 For example, the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction has helped build the disaster 
loss databases in more than 60 countries (www.desinventar.net), and has jointly launched initiatives with the 
Indian Ocean Commission to “provide governments with a new, more robust methodology that will enable them 
to calculate the nature and extent of future risks with much more accuracy, particularly those related to weather 
and climate hazards” (the Indian Ocean Commission, “New Methods to protect our people and our economy 
against disaster risk and climate change”). 
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Figure 1: Basic Model Structure  
 
 
The objectives of the port and the tenant are to maximize their expected profits by choosing both 
investment timing – the “early” investment in period 1 vs. the “late” investment in period 2 – and 
investment amount  𝐼𝑝  and 𝐼𝑡 , given the information available. In particular, two base cases are 
considered and compared: 
 
Case 1. Investments in period 1 and individual decision-making: Here, the port and the tenant 
make their “early” investment decisions based on the subjective distribution of x. Each 
maximizes its own perceived (expected) profit, denoted as 𝜋𝑖, for i = p, t. 
 
Case 2. Investments in period 2 and individual decision-making: In this case, the port and the 
tenant make their “late” investment decisions based on the true distribution of x. Each 
maximizes its own actual (expected) profits, denoted as Π𝑖, for i = p, t. 
 
Comparison of the (equilibrium) investments and profits of Cases 1 and 2 allows us to derive 
managerial and policy insights about investment timing and information accumulation over time. This 
will be done in Section 3. 
 
The disaster-prevention investments are likely to have a positive impact on the port sector (and in turn 
the development of overall regional economies) and so the government may require the port and the 
tenant to coordinate their investments.12 To see if such government invention is justified, we further 
consider the following cases: 
 
12 More generally, the disaster prevention investments are likely to impose a significant positive externality to 
the society (beyond the port sector) and so government subsidy or direct investments may be justified. Such a 
positive externality is not considered in our model, which allows us to focus on the business decision process 
and corporate strategies for port industry. Such an externality and government subsidy, if explicitly modelled, 
will complicate the interpretation of modelling results and prevent clear intuitions to be obtained. For example, 
if the positive externality is sufficiently large, then it will always be optimal for the government to mandate an 
early investment with subsidy. This would “overwhelm” the effects of other issues we would like to examine 
such as timing and information accumulation over time. In addition, the possibility of receiving government 
subsidy in the future could distort firms’ incentives and decisions, since they may postpone or reduce necessary 
investments. Therefore, this paper focuses on the analysis of corporate strategy and industrial policy based on 
the port industry’s well-being only. One may interpret the conclusions obtained as “self-sustained” since 
external financial support or subsidy is not needed. Also, it implies that the investment quantity and optimal 
timing obtained in our study are the “lower bound” of practical decisions, since if a positive social externality is 
considered more investments shall be made at an earlier stage than would be from our model. 
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Case 3. Investments in period 1 with coordination: Here, the investment amounts of the port 
and the tenant are mandated by the government, who chooses 𝐼𝑝  and 𝐼𝑡  in period 1 to 
maximize the industry’s joint profit 𝜋1 + 𝜋2.  
 
Case 4. Investments in period 2 with coordination: In this case, the investment amounts of the 
port and the tenant are mandated by the government, who chooses 𝐼𝑝 and 𝐼𝑡 in period 2 to 
maximize the industry’s joint profit Π1 + Π2. 
 
By comparing the results in Case 3 (Case 4, respectively) with the results in Case 1 (Case 2, 
respectively) we hope to see whether the government intervention is beneficial to the port sector. Note 
that while the joint investment is interpreted here as government intervention, it may also be 
interpreted as coordinated decision-making by the port and the tenant. In addition, comparison of 
Cases 3 and 4 can also shed light on the issue of investment timing. These analyses will be conducted 
in Sections 4 and 5 
 
 
3.  Analysis 
 
3.1 Individual investments  
 
This subsection examines Case 1 and Case 2 where the port and the tenant choose their investment 
levels non-cooperatively. 
 
Case 1 
 
In this case the investment amounts are decided in period 1 when the true distribution of x is not 
known to the port and the tenant. The decisions can only be made based on the perceived distribution 
of x, which is uniform in [0, 1]. Thus their decision problems are as follows:  
 
(1.1)  𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑝𝜋{𝑝,1} = (1 + 𝑘) �𝑅𝑝 − ∫ 𝑀𝑎𝑥�0,𝐷𝑥 − �𝜃𝐼𝑝 + 𝛼𝐼𝑡��𝑑𝑥10 � − 𝐼𝑝 
(1.2)   𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑡𝜋{𝑡,1} = (1 + 𝑘) �𝑅𝑡 − ∫ 𝑀𝑎𝑥�0,𝐷𝑥 − �𝜃𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼𝐼𝑝��𝑑𝑥10 � − 𝐼𝑡 
where subscript “1” denotes Case 1. To obtain the optimal investments for the port and the tenant, we 
first simplify the integrals in (1.1) and (1.2). For ease of notation, define  
 
𝑅𝐷𝑝 =  𝜃𝐼𝑝 + 𝛼𝐼𝑡 and 𝑅𝐷𝑡 =  𝜃𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼𝐼𝑝.  
 
For 𝑖 = {𝑝, 𝑡}, one has 
 
� 𝑀𝑎𝑥{0,𝐷𝑥 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖}1
0
𝑑𝑥 = �� (𝐷𝑥 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖)1𝑅𝐷𝑖/𝐷 𝑑𝑥, 𝑅𝐷𝑖 ≤ 𝐷                      0,                       𝑅𝐷𝑖 > 𝐷   
(2) = � 12𝐷 (𝐷 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖)2,          𝑅𝐷𝑖 ≤ 𝐷                      0,               𝑅𝐷𝑖 > 𝐷 . 
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Using (2) and since it is not optimal for the port and the tenant to invest more than disaster damage D, 
their decision problems can be simplified as: 
 
(3.1)  𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑝  𝜋{𝑝,1} = (1 + 𝑘)[𝑅𝑝 − 12𝐷 �𝐷 − 𝑅𝐷𝑝�2] − 𝐼𝑝 
s.t. 𝑅𝐷𝑝 = 𝜃𝐼𝑝 + 𝛼𝐼𝑡 ≤ 𝐷 
 
(3.2)  𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑡  𝜋{𝑡,1} = (1 + 𝑘)[𝑅𝑡 − 12𝐷 (𝐷 − 𝑅𝐷𝑡)2] − 𝐼𝑡 
s.t. 𝑅𝐷𝑡 = 𝜃𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼𝐼𝑝 ≤ 𝐷 
 
By first ignoring the constraints in (3.1) and (3.2) we obtain the first-order conditions for the port and 
the tenant:13 
 
(4) �
𝜕𝜋{𝑝,1}
𝜕𝐼𝑝
= 𝜃(1+𝑘)
𝐷
�𝐷 − 𝑅𝐷𝑝� − 1 = 0
𝜕𝜋{𝑡,1}
𝜕𝐼𝑡
= 𝜃(1+𝑘)
𝐷
(𝐷 − 𝑅𝐷𝑡) − 1 = 0,   
 
which (jointly) yield the following equilibrium investment levels:  
 
(5) 𝐼{𝑝,1} = 𝐼{𝑡,1} = 𝐷𝛼+𝜃 �1 − 1𝜃(1+𝑘)� 
 
where “tilde” denotes the cases of early investment (i.e., Cases 1 and 3). Substituting 𝐼{𝑝,1} and 𝐼{𝑡,1} 
into constraints (3.1) and (3.2), one has  
𝜃𝐼{𝑝,1} + 𝛼𝐼{𝑡,1} = 𝜃𝐼{𝑡,1} + 𝛼𝐼{𝑝,1} = 𝐷 �1 − 1𝜃(1+𝑘)� < 𝐷,  
thus indicating that 𝐼{𝑝,1} and 𝐼{𝑡,1} are the interior equilibrium investments for the port and the tenant, 
respectively.  
 
It is interesting to see how changes in parameters D, k, 𝛼 and 𝜃 affect the (equilibrium) investment 
levels. It can be easily seen that  
 
(6) 
𝜕𝐼{𝑝,1}
𝜕𝐷
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,1}
𝜕𝐷
> 0 , 𝜕𝐼{𝑝,1}
𝜕𝑘
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,1}
𝜕𝑘
> 0 , 𝜕𝐼{𝑝,1}
𝜕𝛼
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,1}
𝜕𝛼
< 0. 
 
These effects are intuitive: A severer disaster (in terms of damage scale D) leads to more investments 
by both the port and tenant, so does a larger discount factor k. Furthermore, when the spillover factor 
α is larger, the incentive for (own) investments is lower as each party (the port, the tenant) can free-
ride more from the other’s investment. Knowing that the tenant (port, respectively) will reduce its 
investment also promotes the port (tenant, respectively) to raise its own investment as a compensatory 
measure – it can be shown that 
𝜕𝐼{𝑖,1}
𝜕𝐼{𝑗,1} < 0 for 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝑝, 𝑡. The primary, free-ride effect dominates the 
secondary (compensatory) effect, leading to 
𝜕𝐼{𝑝,1}
𝜕𝛼
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,1}
𝜕𝛼
< 0 as in (6).  
 
On the other hand, the signs of 
𝜕𝐼{𝑝,1}
𝜕𝜃
 and 
𝜕𝐼{𝑡,1}
𝜕𝜃
 cannot be determined, where 
 
13 Nevertheless, ignoring the constraints may lead to the problem of the first-order condition approach 
prescribing a solution in which the constraints are violated. There are two ways around this problem: (i) we can 
assume an interior solution and later find conditions for this to be true; or (ii) we can find the equilibria 
explicitly taking into account the constraints. For ease of exposition we shall, without further mentioning, take 
the first approach in this paper. 
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(7) 
𝜕𝐼{𝑝,1}
𝜕𝜃
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,1}
𝜕𝜃
= 𝐷(1+𝑘)(𝛼+𝜃)2𝜃2 (𝛼 + 2𝜃 − (1 + 𝑘)𝜃2). 
 
As can be seen from (7), the effect of 𝜃  depends on the sign of 𝛼 + 2𝜃 − (1 + 𝑘)𝜃2 . It can be 
obtained that  
𝛼 + 2𝜃 − (1 + 𝑘)𝜃2 > (<)0 when θ < (>) 1
1+𝑘
(1 + �1 + 𝛼(1 + 𝑘)) 
respectively. In addition, since 𝛼 + 2𝜃 − (1 + 𝑘)𝜃2 < 𝜃 + 2𝜃 − 𝜃2 = 𝜃(3 − 𝜃), we have 𝜕𝐼{𝑝,1}
𝜕𝜃
< 0 
if the value of 𝜃 is large (e.g., when 𝜃 > 3). The intuition for 𝜕𝐼{𝑝,1}
𝜕𝜃
> 0 is fairly clear: as the disaster-
prevention investment becomes more effective, both the port and tenant would like to increase the 
investment a bit more. The result that 
𝜕𝐼{𝑝,1}
𝜕𝜃
< 0 for sufficiently large 𝜃 is, while it seems counter-
intuitive at the first sight, also sensible. This is because the investments bring no extra benefits other 
than reducing the damage of potential disasters. As a result, the optimal investments by the port and 
the tenant will fall when 𝜃 gets sufficiently large, thereby avoiding the over-investment problem. 
 
With the equilibrium investments being solved, the perceived expected profits for the port and the 
tenant can then be obtained as: 
 
(8.1)  𝜋�{𝑝,1} = (1 + 𝑘)[𝑅𝑝 − 𝐷2𝜃2(1+𝑘)2] − 𝐷𝛼+𝜃 �1 − 1𝜃(1+𝑘)� 
 
(8.2)  𝜋�{𝑡,1} = (1 + 𝑘)[𝑅𝑡 − 𝐷2𝜃2(1+𝑘)2] − 𝐷𝛼+𝜃 �1 − 1𝜃(1+𝑘)�. 
 
Since the true probability distribution of 𝑥 is 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑥), the actual expected profits for the port and the 
tenant can be specified as 
 
(9.1)  𝛱�{𝑝,1} = (1 + 𝑘)[𝑅𝑝 − ∫ 𝑀𝑎𝑥�0,𝐷𝑥 − �𝜃𝐼{𝑝,1} + 𝛼𝐼{𝑡,1}�� 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥] − 𝐼{𝑝,1} 
(9.2)  𝛱�{𝑡,1} = (1 + 𝑘)[𝑅𝑡 − ∫ 𝑀𝑎𝑥�0,𝐷𝑥 − �𝜃𝐼{𝑡,1} + 𝛼𝐼{𝑝,1}�� 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥] − 𝐼{𝑡,1}, 
 
which can be further simplified, for 𝑖 = {𝑝, 𝑡}, as: 
 
(10) 𝛱�{𝑖,1} =
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧ (1 + 𝑘) �𝑅𝑖 − 𝐷 �𝑥+𝑥2 − �1 − 1𝜃(1+𝑘)��� − 𝐼{𝑖,1}, 𝑖𝑓 1 − 1𝜃(1+𝑘) ≤ 𝑥(1 + 𝑘) �𝑅𝑖 − 𝐷2(𝑥−𝑥)�𝑥 − �1 − 1𝜃(1+𝑘)��2� − 𝐼{𝑖,1}, 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 1 − 1𝜃(1+𝑘) < 𝑥(1 + 𝑘)𝑅𝑖 − 𝐼{𝑖,1},                                                                   𝑖𝑓  1 − 1𝜃(1+𝑘) ≥ 𝑥
  
 
Case 2 
 
In Case 2, investments are made in period 2 when the true distribution of 𝑥, i.e. 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑥), is known to 
the port and the tenant. Their decision problems are thus specified as (subscript “2” for Case 2): 
 
(11.1) 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑝𝛱{𝑝,2} = �𝑅𝑝 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� + 𝑘 ��𝑅𝑝 − 𝐼𝑝� − ∫ 𝑀𝑎𝑥{0,𝐷𝑥 − 𝑅𝐷𝑝}𝑥𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥 𝑑𝑥� 
(11.2) 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑡𝛱{𝑡,2} = �𝑅𝑡 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� + 𝑘 �(𝑅𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡) − ∫ 𝑀𝑎𝑥{0,𝐷𝑥 − 𝑅𝐷𝑡} 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� 
 
It can be shown, for 𝑖 = {𝑝, 𝑡}, that  
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(12) ∫ 𝑀𝑎𝑥{0,𝐷𝑥 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖} 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ ∫ [𝐷𝑥 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖] 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥,  𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝐷𝑖 ≤ 𝐷𝑥
∫ [𝐷𝑥 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖] 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑅𝐷𝑖
𝐷
𝑑𝑥, 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑥 < 𝑅𝐷𝑖 < 𝐷𝑥0,                                𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝐷𝑖 ≥ 𝑥,   
which implies that 
 
(13) 
𝜕𝛱{𝑖,2}
𝜕𝐼𝑖
= � 𝑘(𝜃 − 1),                                 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝐷𝑖 ≤ 𝐷𝑥𝑘 � 𝜃
𝐷(𝑥−𝑥) (𝐷𝑥 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖) − 1� ,     𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑥 < 𝑅𝐷𝑖 < 𝐷𝑥
−𝑘,                                        𝑖𝑓  𝑅𝐷𝑖 ≥ 𝑥.   
 
Similar to Case 1, utilizing the first-order conditions 
𝜕𝛱{𝑖,2}
𝜕𝐼𝑖
= 0, 𝑖 = {𝑝, 𝑡} and the requirement θ > 1, 
the equilibrium investments for the port and the tenant can be obtained as: 
 
(14) 𝐼{𝑝,2}∗  = 𝐼{𝑡,2}∗ = 𝐷𝜃+𝛼 �𝑥 − 1𝜃 (𝑥 − 𝑥)� 
 
where “star” denotes the cases of late investment (i.e., Cases 2 and 4). In Case 2 it is straightforward 
to show that 
𝜕𝐼{𝑝,2}∗
𝜕𝐷
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,2}∗
𝜕𝐷
> 0 and 𝜕𝐼{𝑝,2}∗
𝜕𝛼
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,2}∗
𝜕𝛼
< 0 which have the same intuition as in Case 1. 
Unlike Case 1 (where the early investment increases in time discount factor 𝑘) however, the late 
investment is, understandably, independent of 𝑘. On the other hand, 
𝜕𝐼{𝑝,2}∗
𝜕𝜃
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,2}∗
𝜕𝜃
= 𝐷(𝛼+𝜃)2𝜃2 �(𝛼 +2𝜃)(𝑥−𝑥)−𝜃2𝑥 in general cannot be signed. Similar to Case 1, further examination shows that the 
late investment increases in 𝜃 for small 𝜃, while decreasing in 𝜃 when 𝜃 is sufficiently large (recall 
investments bring no extra benefits other than reducing the damage of possible disasters). The profits 
of the port and the tenant can be calculated accordingly, but they are not reported here to save space. 
 
The results from Cases 1 and 2 shed some light on why very large investments against coastal and 
marine disasters (including climate change) are not frequently observed at ports. A port or a tenant 
would only commit large investments if it has a large economic stake (i.e., large Dx), cannot free-ride 
on others (i.e., small 𝛼), has a vision for the future (i.e., large k), and when the investment is effective 
but not too effective (large but not too large 𝜃). 
 
3.2 Coordinated investments 
 
In order to evaluate the effects of government intervention (i.e., whether government should decide 
the investment responsibility of port and tenant) Cases 3 and 4 are now analyzed. 
 
Case 3 
 
In Case 3 the investments are made in period 1, and 𝐼𝑝 and 𝐼𝑡 are coordinated so as to maximize the 
expected total profits of the port and the tenant based on the perceived probability. The decision 
problem is thus given by 
 
(15)  𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑝,𝐼𝑡𝜋3 = 𝜋{𝑝,1} + 𝜋{𝑡,1} = (1 + 𝑘) �𝑅𝑝 + 𝑅𝑡 − ∫ 𝑀𝑎𝑥�0,𝐷𝑥 − �𝜃𝐼𝑝 + 𝛼𝐼𝑡��10 𝑑𝑥  − ∫ 𝑀𝑎𝑥�0,𝐷𝑥 − �𝜃𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼𝐼𝑝��10 𝑑𝑥� − (𝐼𝑝 + 𝐼𝑡). 
 
10 
 
Port Investments on Coastal and Marine Disasters Prevention: An Economic and Policy 
Investigation  
Xiao, Fu, Ng, Zhang 
 
It can be shown that 
 
(16)  ∫ 𝑀𝑎𝑥{0,𝐷𝑥 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖}10 𝑑𝑥 = � ∫ 𝐷𝑥 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖1𝑅𝐷𝑖/𝐷 𝑑𝑥, 𝑅𝐷𝑖 ≤ 𝐷                      0,                     𝑅𝐷𝑖 > 𝐷 ,     for 𝑖 = {𝑝, 𝑡}. 
 
Using (16) the objective function in (15) can be rewritten as,  
 
(17) 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑝,𝐼𝑡𝜋3 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧(1 + 𝑘) �𝑅𝑝 + 𝑅𝑡 − 12𝐷 ��𝐷 − 𝑅𝐷𝑝�2 + (𝐷 − 𝑅𝐷𝑡)2�� − (𝐼𝑝 + 𝐼𝑡), �𝐼𝑝, 𝐼𝑡� ∈ ①(1 + 𝑘) �𝑅𝑝 + 𝑅𝑡 − 12𝐷 �𝐷 − 𝑅𝐷𝑝�2� − (𝐼𝑝 + 𝐼𝑡), �𝐼𝑝, 𝐼𝑡� ∈ ②(1 + 𝑘) �𝑅𝑝 + 𝑅𝑡 − 12𝐷 (𝐷 − 𝑅𝐷𝑡)2� − (𝐼𝑝 + 𝐼𝑡), �𝐼𝑝, 𝐼𝑡� ∈ ③(1 + 𝑘)(𝑅𝑝 + 𝑅𝑡) − (𝐼𝑝 + 𝐼𝑡), �𝐼𝑝, 𝐼𝑡� ∈ ④
 , 
 
where the investment decision areas ①-④ are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Solving the first-order conditions 𝜕𝜋3
𝜕𝐼𝑖
= 0, 𝑖 = {𝑝, 𝑡}, the optimal solutions can be obtained as: 
 
(18) 𝐼{𝑝,3} = 𝐼{𝑡,3} = 𝐷𝛼+𝜃 �1 − 1(𝜃+𝛼)(1+𝑘)�.   
 
The perceived expected profits for the port and the tenant can be calculated accordingly as: 
 
(19) 𝜋�{𝑖,3} = (1 + 𝑘) �𝑅𝑖 − 12𝐷 �𝐷 − 𝑅𝐷� {𝑖,3}�2� − 𝐼{𝑖,3},         for 𝑖 = {𝑝, 𝑡} 
 
where 𝑅𝐷� {𝑝,3} =  𝜃𝐼{𝑝,3} + 𝛼𝐼{𝑡,3}  and 𝑅𝐷� {𝑡,3} =  𝜃𝐼{𝑡,3} + 𝛼𝐼{𝑝,3} . Since the true probability 
distribution of x is 𝑈(𝑥,𝑥) (rather than 𝑈(0,1)), the actual expected payoff for the port and the tenant 
is 𝛱�{𝑖,3} = (1 + 𝑘)[𝑅𝑖 − ∫ 𝑀𝑎𝑥�0,𝐷𝑥 − 𝑅𝐷� {𝑖,3}� 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥] − 𝐼{𝑖,3} . This payoff can be further 
calculated as: 
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(20) 𝛱�{𝑖,3} =
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧ (1 + 𝑘) �𝑅𝑖 − 𝐷 �𝑥+𝑥2 − �1 − 1(𝜃+𝛼)(1+𝑘)��� − 𝐼{𝑖,3}, 𝑖𝑓 1 − 1(𝜃+𝛼)(1+𝑘) ≤ 𝑥(1 + 𝑘) �𝑅𝑖 − 𝐷2(𝑥−𝑥)�𝑥 − �1 − 1(𝜃+𝛼)(1+𝑘)��2� − 𝐼{𝑖,3}, 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 1 − 1(𝜃+𝛼)(1+𝑘) < 𝑥(1 + 𝑘)𝑅𝑖 − 𝐼{𝑖,3},                                                                                       𝑖𝑓  1 − 1(𝜃+𝛼)(1+𝑘) ≥ 𝑥,
  
 
It is easy to show that 
𝜕𝐼{𝑝,3}
𝜕𝑘
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,3}
𝜕𝑘
> 0, which is similar to the result in Case 1. But the signs of 
other comparative statics are not straightforward: 
 
(21) 
𝜕𝐼{𝑝,3}
𝜕𝛼
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,3}
𝜕𝛼
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑝,3}
𝜕𝜃
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,3}
𝜕𝜃
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑝,3}
𝜕(𝛼+𝜃) = 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,3}𝜕(𝛼+𝜃) = 𝐷(𝛼+𝜃)3 � 21+𝑘 − (𝛼 + 𝜃)�. 
 
Note that in Case 3 (where 𝐼𝑝 and 𝐼𝑡 are chosen jointly to maximize the combined profit), the benefit 
derived from unit investment is 𝛼 + 𝜃. Equations (21) show that for small values of 𝛼 and 𝜃, the 
prevention investments increase in 𝛼 + 𝜃, as expected. On the other hand, as there is no free-ride 
problem in choosing investment levels in this case, the optimal investments will be reduced for large 
𝛼 + 𝜃 so as to avoid potential over-investment in disaster prevention. The latter occurs when 𝛼 + 𝜃 >
2
1+𝑘
. 
 
Case 4 
 
In Case 4, investments are postponed to the second period when the true distribution of 𝑥 is known. 
Investments 𝐼𝑝 and 𝐼𝑡 are jointly chosen to maximize the sum of the actual expected profits of the port 
and the tenant. The decision problem is thus specified as, 
 
(22)  𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑝,𝐼𝑡𝛱4 = 𝛱{𝑝,2} + 𝛱{𝑡,2} = �𝑅𝑝 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� + �𝑅𝑡 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� + 𝑘 �𝑅𝑝 − 𝐼𝑝 −
𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑎𝑥{0,𝐷𝑥−𝜃𝐼𝑝+𝛼𝐼𝑡}1𝑥−𝑥𝑑𝑥+𝑅𝑡−𝐼𝑡−𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑎𝑥{0,𝐷𝑥−𝜃𝐼𝑡+𝛼𝐼𝑝}1𝑥−𝑥𝑑𝑥. 
 
As shown in the Appendix, solving problem (22) yields the following optimal investments for the port 
and the tenant: 
 
(23) 𝐼{𝑝,4}∗ = 𝐼{𝑡,4}∗ = 𝐷𝛼+𝜃 �𝑥 − 1𝛼+𝜃 (𝑥 − 𝑥)�. 
 
Similarly to Case 3, the sign of comparative statics (24) below are in general ambiguous: 
 
(24) 
𝜕𝐼{𝑝,4}∗
𝜕𝛼
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,4}∗
𝜕𝛼
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑝,4}∗
𝜕𝜃
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,4}∗
𝜕𝜃
= 𝜕𝐼{𝑝,4}∗
𝜕(𝛼+𝜃) = 𝜕𝐼{𝑡,4}∗𝜕(𝛼+𝜃) = 𝐷(𝛼+𝜃)3 �2(𝑥 − 𝑥) − 𝑥(𝛼 + 𝜃)� 
 
The interpretations are also similar. 
 
 
4.  Effects of Investment Timing and Coordination 
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This section examines the effects of investment timing and coordination y comparing the profit and 
investment levels across the four cases studied above.  
 
5.1 Invest earlier or wait? 
 
In this subsection, the effect of investment timing is examined by comparing Cases 1 vs. 2 and Cases 
3 vs. 4. 
 
Comparison between Case 1 and Case 2 
 
In these two cases, the port and the tenant decide their investments non-cooperatively. The difference 
is that in Case 2 the true probability of x is known, while in Case 1 the decisions can only be made 
upon the perceived probability. Therefore, comparison between these two cases allows us to evaluate 
the cost and benefit associated with the early investment (vs. the late investment). On one hand, an 
early investment in period 1 allows a longer time for investment to be paid off. On the other hand, a 
late investment in period 2 allows the investments to be invested based on a better understanding of 
the risks associated with natural disasters, thereby reducing from over-investments or sub-investments. 
 
To identify whether the early or late investment is a better choice for the port and the tenant, one 
needs to compare the actual expected profits in the two cases. As reported in equation (10), the actual 
expected profits for the port and the tenant in Case 1 are piecewise functions. The comparison shows 
that if 1 − 1
𝜃(1+𝑘) ≤ 𝑥, the actual expected profits of the port and the tenant in Case 1 are always 
greater than those in Case 2. 14 However, if 𝑥 ≤ min � 1
4𝜃+𝑘
, 𝑘(𝑘+1)(𝑘+2)�, then the actual expected 
profits of the port and the tenant in Case 2 are always greater than those in Case 1. Otherwise the 
relative size of the expected profits in the two cases depends on parameters 𝜃,𝛼,𝑘 and 𝑥,𝑥.  
 
Intuitively, when 1 − 1
𝜃(1+𝑘) ≤ 𝑥 , the natural disaster happens with high probability, and so the 
benefit associated with early investment outweighs the possible information gain from waiting (i.e., 
investing in the second period). As a result, it is always better to make an early investment. However, 
if the probability of the natural disaster is very low (i.e., 𝑥 ≤ min � 1
4𝜃+𝑘
, 𝑘(𝑘+1)(𝑘+2)�), the benefit 
associated with longer pay-off time cannot offset the negative effect associated with sub-optimal 
investments (owing to inferior information about the risk of natural disasters). It is better therefore to 
postpone investment to period 2. If the probability of natural disaster is neither too high nor too low, 
the optimal timing will then depend on many factors that determine the relative size of the benefits 
associated with information gains against the benefits associated with longer pay-off time. 
 
We further conduct comparison of the equilibrium investments in Cases 1 and 2, that is, 
 
(25)  𝐼{𝑖,1} − 𝐼{𝑖,2}∗ = 𝐷(𝛼+𝜃)𝜃 �𝑥 − 𝑥 − � 11+𝑘 − 𝜃(1 − 𝑥)��,         𝑖 = {𝑡,𝑝}. 
 
The sign of (25) depends on whether 𝑥 − 𝑥 > 1
1+𝑘
− 𝜃(1 − 𝑥), i.e., the position and length of the 
interval of [𝑥, 𝑥] – as reflected by 𝑥 and 𝑥 − 𝑥 – and parameters 𝜃 and k. Two extreme scenarios are 
worth noting. First, the port and the tenant would invest less in period 2 than in period 1 (that is, 
𝐼{𝑖,1} > 𝐼{𝑖,2}∗ ) if the length of interval �𝑥,𝑥� is large enough such that 𝑥 − 𝑥 > 11+𝑘. This corresponds 
14 The derivations for this and other results of this section are long and tedious, and is not reported here. They 
are available upon request.  
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to the situation of little information gain from waiting, that is, the interval of �𝑥,𝑥� does not shrink 
much from [0,1]. The other extreme scenario is when 𝑥 < 1 − 1
𝜃(1+𝑘) and the interval of �𝑥,𝑥� is so 
narrow that 𝑥 − 𝑥 ≈ 0. This corresponds to a situation where the risk of natural disaster is low and 
there is much information gain from waiting. In this scenario, understandably the port and the tenant 
would invest more in period 2 than in period 1.  
 
Comparison between Case 3 and Case 4 
 
In these two cases, the investments are coordinated between the port and the tenant by, say, the 
government, so as to maximize the joint industry profit. In Case 3 the government makes the 
investment decision in period 1 based on the perceived probability distribution of x while the 
decisions are made, in Case 4, in period 2 when the true probability distribution of x is known. 
Comparing the optimal investments in Cases 3 and 4 yields: 
 
(26)  𝐼{𝑖,3} − 𝐼{𝑖,4}∗ = 𝐷(𝛼+𝜃)2 �𝑥 − 𝑥 − � 11+𝑘 − (𝛼 + 𝜃)(1 − 𝑥)��,       for 𝑖 = {𝑡,𝑝}. 
Thus whether the late (coordinated) investments are, in general, greater or smaller than the early 
(coordinated) investments depends on parameters 𝛼 + 𝜃, 𝛼, 𝑥 and 𝑥. The extreme scenarios can be 
similarly discussed as in the comparison between Cases 1 and 2. 
 
By comparing the actual expected profits in the two cases, we obtain conclusions (and associated 
intuitive explanations) that are similar to those in the above Case 1-Case 2 comparison. Specifically, if 1 − 1(𝜃+𝛼)(1+𝑘) ≤ 𝑥, the actual expected profits of the port and the tenant in Case 3 are always greater 
than those in Case 4. However, if 𝑥 ≤ min � 1
4𝜃+𝑘
, 1+2𝑘
2(𝑘+1)(𝑘+2) , 1𝑘 − 2𝑘(1+𝑘)𝜃� , the actual expected 
profits in Case 4 are always greater than those in Case 3. Otherwise, the relative magnitude of the 
profits in the two cases depends on parameters 𝜃,𝛼,𝑘 and 𝑥,𝑥. 
 
The profit-comparison results are summarized in Table 1 and Proposition 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Profit comparison between earlier and later investment (EP=Expected profit) 
 
Proposition 1:  (i) Our comparison between Case 1 and Case 2 shows that when the natural disaster 
happens with high probability in a given period (in the sense 1 − 1
𝜃(1+𝑘) ≤ 𝑥), it is always better for 
the port and the tenant to invest earlier. However, when the probability of the natural disaster is very 
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low (in the sense 𝑥 ≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 � 1
4𝜃+𝑘
, 𝑘(𝑘+1)(𝑘+2)�), then it is better to postpone the investments to period 2. 
When the probability of natural disaster is neither too high nor too low, the optimal timing will then 
depend on many factors that determine the relative size of the benefits associated with information 
gains against the benefits associated with longer pay-off time.   
(ii) Similar results are obtained in the Case 3-Case 4 comparison (with the detailed 
conditions given in Table 1). 
 
 
5.2 Is coordination always better? 
 
After examination of investment timing, we now proceed to investigate the question of whether the 
coordinated decision-making on prevention investments is better than the individual, non-cooperative 
decision-making. This is done by comparing between Case 1 (Case 2, respectively) and Case 3 (Case 
4, respectively) in which investments are made in period 1 (period 2, respectively). Comparing first 
the (equilibrium) investment levels, one has: 
 
(27.1)  𝐼{𝑖,1} − 𝐼{𝑖,3} = 𝐷(𝛼+𝜃)(1+𝑘) � 1𝛼+𝜃 − 1𝜃� < 0 
(27.2)  𝐼{𝑖,2}∗ − 𝐼{𝑖,4}∗ = 𝐷�𝑥−𝑥�(𝛼+𝜃) � 1𝛼+𝜃 − 1𝜃� < 0, 
 
where 𝑖 = {𝑡,𝑝}. Thus, when decisions are made by the port and the tenant non-cooperatively their 
investments are always lower that would be when decisions are made with coordination. This result 
holds for both the early-investment (period 1) and late-investment (period 2) cases, and arises owing 
to the free-ride problem discussed earlier. Furthermore, the differences in investment levels decrease 
in α. In other words, the port and the tenant will invest less if they could benefit more from their 
partner’s investment. However, whether this will benefit the port industry is not self-evident, and 
requires a further profit comparison which is discussed below. 
 
Profit comparison between Case 1 and Case 3 
 
In both Cases 1 and 3, investments are made in period 1 based on the perceived probability 
distribution of x. In Case 1 the investment decision is individually made by the port and the tenant. In 
Case 3 however, investments are coordinated, thus overcoming the free-ride problem as shown in 
(27.1). 
 
However, since the actual expected profits in Cases 1 and 3 are piecewise functions (i.e. eq. (10) and 
eq. (21) respectively), actual profits are dependent on the true distribution of x. It turns out that 
analytically, no general conclusions could be derived for profit comparisons. Still, two extreme 
scenarios are worth noting. When 𝑥 ≥ 1 − 1(𝜃+𝛼)(1+𝑘), it can be concluded that 𝛱�{𝑖,1} ≤ 𝛱�{𝑖,3}, 𝑖 ={𝑡,𝑝}; that is, if there is a high chance of disaster, the port and the tenant will be better-off with their 
investments being coordinated (rather than being individually made). On the other extreme, if 
𝑥 ≤ 1 − 1
𝜃(1+𝑘), then 𝛱�{𝑖,1} ≥ 𝛱�{𝑖,3}, 𝑖 = {𝑡,𝑝}. In other words, when disaster is not likely to occur, the 
port and the tenant will be worse off if investments are coordinated. The intuition for this latter result 
is as follows: although coordination overcomes the free-ride problem and thus leads to greater 
investment levels, coordinated investments are not based on better knowledge of the disaster. This 
could lead to “over-investments” (recall that the prevention investments bring no extra benefit other 
than reducing disaster damage to zero) when the risk of natural disaster is actually low, resulting in 
less profit for the port industry as a whole. 
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Profit comparison between Case 2 and Case 4 
 
In both Cases 2 and 4, investments are made in period 2 based on the actual probability distribution of 
x. In Case 2 the investment decisions are individually made by the port and tenant, while in Case 4 the 
decisions are coordinated. The following result can be shown: 
 
(28) 𝛱{𝑖,2}∗ < 𝛱{𝑖,4}∗ , where 𝑖 = {𝑡,𝑝}. 
 
As expected, coordination leads to greater expected profits. The intuition is that with the same 
knowledge about the probability of natural disasters, the coordinated decision-making eliminates the 
free-ride problem and thus leads to an optimal outcome for the stakeholders. 
 
The above comparison results are summarized in Table 2 and Proposition 2. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Profit comparison between coordinated and individual investment (EP=Expected profit) 
 
Proposition 2:  (i) For the port and the tenant, the coordinated investments (including both the early 
and late investment cases) are always greater than the investment levels decided non-cooperatively. 
Further, the differences increase in 𝛼 , a parameter that measures the benefit spillover from one 
party’s disaster-prevention investment to the other. 
(ii) Our comparison between Case 1 and Case 3 shows that when there is a very high chance 
of disaster (in the sense 𝑥 ≥ 1 − 1(𝜃+𝛼)(1+𝑘)), then 𝛱�{𝑖,1} ≤ 𝛱�{𝑖,3}, 𝑖 = {𝑡,𝑝}, i.e., the port and the 
tenant will be better-off with their investments being coordinated. However, when disaster is not very 
likely to occur (in the sense 𝑥 ≤ 1 − 1
𝜃(1+𝑘)), then 𝛱�{𝑖,1} ≥ 𝛱�{𝑖,3}, 𝑖 = {𝑡,𝑝}: i.e., the port and the 
tenant will be worse-off with coordinated investments than with non-cooperative investments.  
(iii) The Case 2-Case 4 comparison shows that 𝛱{𝑖,2}∗ < 𝛱{𝑖,4}∗ , 𝑖 = {𝑡,𝑝}, for any level of 
disaster probability: i.e., if the investment decisions are made in period 2, coordination leads to 
greater expected profits for both the port and the tenant. 
 
 
As can be seen from Part (ii) of Proposition 2, coordination of the disaster-prevention investments is 
an inferior solution for the port and the tenant when there is a very low chance of disaster. As such, 
the situation could be particularly bad if such coordination is imposed by the government (e.g., 
regulations) rather than by the port industry itself. Furthermore, while results on the effect of 
coordination could not be derived analytically when the probability of natural disaster is neither too 
high nor too low, our numerical simulation shows that in such situations, letting the port and the 
tenant choose their own investments in period 1 can still be a better solution. This is a new finding in 
the literature. Basically, the coordinated investments are always greater than the non-cooperative 
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independent levels, owing to the removal of the free-ride problem. However, without knowing the 
true risk associated with the disaster in period 1, there is a possibility of “over-investment” as 
indicated above. The result suggests the importance to consider all the relevant factors, such as 
uncertainty, investment timing and externality in an integrated model.  
 
Taken together, the comparison results in Tables 1 and 2 further reveals: 
 
Proposition 3:  (i) When 𝑥 ≥ 1 − 1(𝜃+𝛼)(1+𝑘), we have 𝛱{𝑖,2}∗ < 𝛱�{𝑖,1} ≤ 𝛱�{𝑖,3} and 𝛱{𝑖,4}∗ < 𝛱�{𝑖,3}, 𝑖 ={𝑡,𝑝}: i.e., if there is a very high risk of disaster, then both the port and tenant will be better-off if the 
prevention investments are made early and in coordination between the port and the tenant. 
 (ii) When 𝑥 ≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 � 1
4𝜃+𝑘
, 𝑘(𝑘+1)(𝑘+2) , 1𝑘 − 2𝑘(𝑘+1)𝜃 , 1 − 1𝜃(𝑘+1)� , we have 𝛱�{𝑖,3} < 𝛱�{𝑖,1}  and 
𝛱�{𝑖,1} < 𝛱{𝑖,2}∗ < 𝛱{𝑖,4}∗ , 𝑖 = {𝑡,𝑝}. That is, if the risk of disaster is very low, while both the port and 
tenant would be worse-off with coordinated investments if the investments were made in period 1, 
their best outcome is achieved when the investments are postponed to period 2 and are coordinated. 
 
 
The intuition behind Part (ii) of Proposition 3 is quite clear: if there is a very low risk of disaster, then 
the investments should be postponed such that the investment decisions can be made based on a better 
knowledge of the risk. Given this, when such information is available in period 2, it is always better to 
coordinate investments (Part (iii) of Proposition 2) which can resolve the free-ride problem. 
 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Ports are of critical importance to international trade and the global economy. With the rapid 
development of port-focal logistics (Ng and Liu, 2014) and multimodal transport systems, more and 
more activities are carried out on ports’ land by stakeholders such as terminal operators, warehouse 
keepers and logistics operators, and more logistics parks, office buildings, hotels and other 
infrastructures are built within or proximate to ports. If ports and their tenants fail to secure sufficient 
investments in preventing or alleviating natural disasters, major damages and financial losses could 
happen to the port community and the whole society. 
There have been significant increases in the frequency and magnitude of coastal and marine disasters, 
owing at least in part to climate change and global warming, t. So far however, only a handful of 
major disaster-prevention investments have been committed or carried out. Numerous factors could 
have been blamed for: for example, since such investments could benefit both ports and their tenants, 
both sides have an incentive to free ride. In addition, there is yet to be a good understanding of the 
risks and consequences of coastal and marine natural disasters. As a consequence, even if ports could 
obtain financial supports from governments, they may prefer to use them on other more prioritized 
areas (e.g., business expansion) instead of disaster-prevention facilities. Although governments might 
coordinate or mandate investments for ports and tenants, they do not necessarily have a better 
knowledge than the port industry. Therefore, it is unclear what the optimal policy is, and to what 
extent government should intervene in decisions such as investment timing and scale. 
This study has hence constructed an integrated model with which the decision-making processes of 
port, tenant and regulator can be characterized. Our results suggest that there are tradeoffs for making 
early investments: an early investment allows a longer time for investment to be paid off, while 
postponing investment allows stakeholders to get a better understanding of the risk associated with 
disasters so that there are minimal over-investments or sub-investments. Furthermore, without 
government’s coordination, the non-cooperative port and tenant might reduce their own investments 
as they could benefit from the other side’s investment. While government’s coordination would 
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increase the investment amounts due to removal of the free-ride problem, this does not necessarily 
lead to better outcomes overall because, as mentioned earlier, governments usually do not have better 
information about natural and marine disaster risks than the port community. There are times when 
government’s coordination or intervention could lead to an inferior outcome, owing to too much 
investment. We further identified conditions under which government should make the decisions 
related to investment timing and amount. In particular, if there is a high risk of disaster, then the 
government should mandate an early investment and further specify the investment amounts for the 
port and the tenant. Otherwise if the risk of disaster is very low, the best outcome will be achieved if 
investments are postponed to a later stage with coordination. Both the port and the tenant are better-
off in these two situations. Note that most studies have justified government regulation and subsidy 
because of the existence of negative externalities (e.g., pollution) to the society. That is different from 
the scenario considered in this study, where only profits of the port community are considered. 
 
The study also demonstrates the economic value of a better understanding of natural disasters, since 
the choices of optimal corporate strategy and government policy are all dependent on the true 
probability distribution of disasters. Government supports to scientific research of natural disasters are 
therefore of both operational value and economic significance. The research fund and subsidy will not 
only benefit the global community in terms of saving lives and protecting the environment, but also 
bring about substantial economic returns. Finally, our modelling results shed some light on why major 
investments in preventing or alleviating natural disasters (including climate change) have not been 
frequently observed: a port or a tenant would only commit large investments if it has a large economic 
stake, cannot free-ride on others, has a vision for the future, and when the investment is (but not too) 
effective. Investment against natural disasters is a very complex decision involving numerous 
determinants, and it is important to develop an integrated model taking into account of the important 
factors which may interact with each other. Further research is urgently required, especially the 
collection of relevant time-series data (which is seriously lacking at the moment) and empirical 
analysis. 
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Appendix: Optimal investments with coordination in period 2 
In order to get the optimal investment solution by solving the problem (23), we consider the two 
scenarios of 𝐼𝑝 ≥ 𝐼𝑡 and 𝐼𝑝 < 𝐼𝑡. 
 
Scenario One: 𝐼𝑝 ≥ 𝐼𝑡 
In this scenario, 𝐼𝑝 ≥ 𝐼𝑡 implies that 𝑅𝐷𝑝 ≥ 𝑅𝐷𝑡. The objective function in (23) can be specified for 
the following six sub-cases based on the ranges of 𝐼𝑝 and 𝐼𝑡 as defined in Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
Sub-case I: If 𝑅𝐷𝑝 ≤ 𝐷𝑥, i.e., (𝐼𝑝, 𝐼𝑡) ∈ ① in Figure 3 or Figure 4, objective function (23) can be 
simplified as 
 
(A.1) 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑝,𝐼𝑡𝜋4 = �𝑅𝑝 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� + �𝑅𝑡 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� +  𝑘 �𝑅𝑝 − 𝐼𝑝 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 −𝑥𝑥
𝜃𝐼𝑝+𝛼𝐼𝑡1𝑥−𝑥𝑑𝑥+𝑅𝑡−𝐼𝑡−𝑥𝑥𝜃𝐼𝑡+𝛼𝐼𝑝1𝑥−𝑥𝑑𝑥= 𝑘𝑅𝑝−𝐼𝑝+𝑅𝐷𝑝+𝑅𝑡−𝐼𝑡+𝑅𝐷𝑡−𝐷𝑥+𝑥. 
 
Sub-case II: If 𝑅𝐷𝑡 ≤ 𝐷𝑥 and 𝐷𝑥 < 𝑅𝐷𝑝 < 𝐷𝑥, i.e., (𝐼𝑝, 𝐼𝑡) ∈ ② in Figure 3 or Figure 4, objective 
function (23) can be simplified as 
 
(A.2) 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑝,𝐼𝑡𝜋4 = �𝑅𝑝 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� + �𝑅𝑡 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� + 𝑘 �𝑅𝑝 − 𝐼𝑝 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 −𝑥𝑅𝐷𝑝/𝐷
𝜃𝐼𝑝+𝛼𝐼𝑡1𝑥−𝑥𝑑𝑥+𝑅𝑡−𝐼𝑡−𝑥𝑥𝜃𝐼𝑡+𝛼𝐼𝑝1𝑥−𝑥𝑑𝑥= 𝑘𝑅𝑝−𝐼𝑝−𝐷𝑥−𝑅𝐷𝑝22𝐷𝑥−𝑥+𝑅𝑡−𝐼𝑡−𝐷𝑥+𝑥2+𝑅𝐷𝑡. 
 
Sub-case III: If 𝑅𝐷𝑡 ≤ 𝐷𝑥  and 𝑅𝐷𝑝 ≥ 𝐷𝑥 , i.e., (𝐼𝑝, 𝐼𝑡) ∈ ③  in Figure 3 when 𝛼𝑥 < 𝜃𝑥 , but as 
depicted in Figure 4, there is no feasible (𝐼𝑝, 𝐼𝑡) when 𝛼𝑥 ≥ 𝜃𝑥, then objective function (23) can be 
simplified as 
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(A.3) 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑝,𝐼𝑡𝜋4 = �𝑅𝑝 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� + �𝑅𝑡 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� + 𝑘 �𝑅𝑝 − 𝐼𝑝 + 𝑅𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡 −
𝑥𝑥𝜃𝐼𝑡+𝛼𝐼𝑝1𝑥−𝑥𝑑𝑥=𝑘𝑅𝑝−𝐼𝑝+𝑅𝑡−𝐼𝑡−𝐷𝑥+𝑥2+𝑅𝐷𝑡. 
 
Sub-case IV: If 𝑅𝐷𝑡 > 𝐷𝑥  and 𝑅𝐷𝑝 < 𝐷𝑥 , i.e., (𝐼𝑝, 𝐼𝑡) ∈ ④  in Figure 3 or Figure 4, objective 
function (23) can be simplified as 
 
(A.4) 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑝,𝐼𝑡𝜋4 = �𝑅𝑝 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� + �𝑅𝑡 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� +  𝑘 �𝑅𝑝 − 𝐼𝑝 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 −𝑥𝑅𝐷𝑝/𝐷
𝜃𝐼𝑝+𝛼𝐼𝑡1𝑥−𝑥𝑑𝑥+𝑅𝑡−𝐼𝑡−𝑅𝐷𝑡/𝐷𝑥𝜃𝐼𝑡+𝛼𝐼𝑝1𝑥−𝑥𝑑𝑥= 
𝑘 �𝑅𝑝 − 𝐼𝑝 −
�𝐷𝑥−𝑅𝐷𝑝�
2
2𝐷(𝑥−𝑥) + 𝑅𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡 − (𝐷𝑥−𝑅𝐷𝑡)22𝐷(𝑥−𝑥) �. 
 
Sub-case V: If 𝐷𝑥 < 𝑅𝐷𝑡 <  𝐷𝑥 and 𝑅𝐷𝑝 ≥ 𝐷𝑥, i.e., (𝐼𝑝, 𝐼𝑡) ∈ ⑤ in Figure 3 or Figure 4, objective 
function (23) can be simplified as 
 
(A.5) 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑝,𝐼𝑡𝜋4 = �𝑅𝑝 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� + �𝑅𝑡 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� +  𝑘 �𝑅𝑝 − 𝐼𝑝 + 𝑅𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡 −
𝑅𝐷𝑡𝐷𝑥𝜃𝐼𝑡+𝛼𝐼𝑝1𝑥−𝑥𝑑𝑥= 𝑘𝑅𝑝−𝐼𝑝+𝑅𝑡−𝐼𝑡−𝐷𝑥−𝑅𝐷𝑡22𝐷(𝑥−𝑥). 
 
Sub-case VI: If 𝑅𝐷𝑡 ≥ 𝐷𝑥, i.e., (𝐼𝑝, 𝐼𝑡) ∈⑥ in Figure 3 or Figure 4, objective function (23) can be 
simplified as 
 
(A.6)  𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑝,𝐼𝑡𝜋4 = �𝑅𝑝 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� + �𝑅𝑡 − ∫ 𝐷𝑥 1𝑥−𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑥� + 𝑘�𝑅𝑝 − 𝐼𝑝 + 𝑅𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡�. 
 
Scenario Two: 𝐼𝑝 < 𝐼𝑡 
In this scenario, condition 𝐼𝑝 < 𝐼𝑡  implies that 𝑅𝐷𝑝 < 𝑅𝐷𝑡 . The objective function in (23) can be 
specified for another six sub-cases based on the ranges of 𝐼𝑝 and 𝐼𝑡 as in Scenario one, derivation 
details of which are not reported here. 
 
Now, by applying the first-order conditions 𝜕𝜋4
𝜕𝐼𝑖
= 0, 𝑖 = {𝑝, 𝑡} to different cases in the above two 
scenarios, the optimal capacity investments can be obtained as follows: 
 
(A.7) 𝐼{𝑝,4}∗ = 𝐼{𝑡,4}∗ = 𝐷𝛼+𝜃 �𝑥 − 1𝛼+𝜃 (𝑥 − 𝑥)� 
 
Thus, the actual expected payoffs across two periods for the port and the tenant can be obtained 
accordingly. 
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